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Abstract 
This paper offers a critical perspective on Israel Kirzner’s basic analytical framework. 
Specifically, we characterize Kirzner’s emphasis on processes of equilibration as a 
departure from the causal-realist price theory developed by Menger and his nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century followers. In this context, we contrast Kirzner’s interpretation of 
entrepreneurship as discovery with a more realistic, and operationally meaningful, idea of 
entrepreneurship as action. Finally, we discuss an inconsistency in Kirzner’s treatment of 
the antecedents of entrepreneurial behavior.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Israel Kirzner’s concept of entrepreneurship as alertness to profit opportunities is conventionally 
seen as one of the seminal contributions to modern entrepreneurship theory along with those of 
Schumpeter (1911) and Knight (1921). The distinction between “Schumpeterian” and 
“Kirznerian” entrepreneurs has become standard in the literature (although Kirzner (2009) 
himself contests the distinction). Among Austrian economists, Kirzner’s understanding of the 
market as “an entrepreneurially driven process” (Kirzner, 1997, p.67) and a “process of mutual 
discovery” (Kirzner, 1997, p.71) is a dominant perspective on production, exchange, and 
welfare.1  
More recently, Kirzner’s concept of entrepreneurship has also become hugely influential in 
management research on entrepreneurship (e.g., Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003), 
where the “opportunity identification” literature seeks to build a positive research program by 
operationalizing alertness and identifying its cognitive and motivational antecedents. The aim is 
to understand what drives opportunity discovery on the level of individual entrepreneurs (Cooper 
et al., 1995; Gaglio and Katz, 2001)—a research program in many ways inconsistent with 
Kirzner’s own understanding of the implications of his approach (Klein, 2008b; Kirzner, 2009). 
Kirzner’s research program is under discussion elsewhere in this issue, but mainly from 
perspectives that accept the basic Kirznerian understanding of the nature of the entrepreneur and 
the market, namely that entrepreneurship is best conceived as the discovery of hitherto unknown 
profit opportunities, and that entrepreneurial action tends to move market prices and quantities 
toward long-run equilibrium values.  We offer here a different, perhaps more fundamental 
critique of Kirzner, one that questions the basic concept of entrepreneurship as alertness or 
discovery. We contrast Kirzner’s emphasis on equilibration and the role of the “pure 
                                                            
1 Kirzner’s work has given rise to much critical discussion since its original statement in Kirzner’s Competition and 
Entrepreneurship (1973), mainly (but not exclusively, e.g., Demsetz, 1983) among Austrian economists (Rothbard, 
1974; High, 1982; Salerno, 1993, 2008). 
2 
 
entrepreneur” in explaining equilibrating tendencies, with the causal-realist price-theory tradition 
from the Scholastics to Cantillon to Menger to Wicksteed, Fetter, and Davenport to Mises and 
his students. In the latter tradition, the aim is to explain actual, real-world, short-term market 
prices and not hypothetical processes of equilibration moving those prices toward longer-run 
equilibrium values Klein (2008a). In this tradition, as we interpret it, there is little need to invoke 
Kirznerian discovery. Relatedly, we contrast the discovery approach with an alternative 
interpretation of entrepreneurship that we associate with Cantillon (1730), Knight (1921), and 
Mises (1949), an approach in which entrepreneurship is interpreted not as alertness or discovery, 
but as action under uncertainty. Importantly, the Kirznerian notion of alertness does not 
presuppose uncertainty, and it differs from the concept of action in having no opportunity cost. 
In this context, we criticize Kirzner’s denial that the entrepreneur must own capital.  
Finally, we discuss an inconsistency in Kirzner’s treatment of the antecedents of 
entrepreneurial discovery. Ideal types can be more or less anonymous Schutz (1932), and 
Kirzner’s pure entrepreneur is particularly anonymous, more so than Mises’s property-owning 
capitalist-entrepreneur. While the capitalist-entrepreneur, who is not merely a “discoverer” but a 
buyer and seller, acts within and is affected by a particular institutional setting, Kirzner’s 
discoverer-entrepreneur exists outside any particular institutional environment. Indeed, Kirzner 
treats discovery as an explanatory primary, holding that personal, psychological, demographic, 
and similar characteristics cannot be invoked to explain discovery. And yet, at the same time, he 
has consistently argued that public policies inhibit entrepreneurial discovery (e.g., Kirzner, 
1984), based on the notion that public policies block profit opportunities.   
THE MARKET VERSUS THE “MARKET PROCESS” 
In previous works we have distinguished Kirzner’s understanding of entrepreneurship as 
discovery from the “judgment” approach that we associate with Mises and Frank Knight, and 
that we have developed in our own work (Foss and Klein, 2005; Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein, 
2007; Foss, Foss, and Klein, 2007; Klein, 2008b). Judgment refers primarily to business decision 
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making when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual 
outcomes, is generally unknown (what Knight (1921) terms uncertainty, rather than probabilistic 
risk). Knight introduces judgment to link profit and the firm to uncertainty. Entrepreneurship 
represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, 
accordingly, be paid a wage.2 This is because entrepreneurship is judgment in relation to the most 
uncertain events, such as starting a new firm, defining a new market, and the like. In other words, 
there is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on and, therefore, exercising 
judgment requires the person with judgment to purchase and organize factors of production—in 
other words, to start a firm. Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision 
making is ultimately decision making about the employment of resources.  
The judgment approach fits, broadly, within the price-theoretic tradition of the Austrian 
school, what Klein (2008a) terms “mundane Austrian economics.” This tradition, sometimes 
called “causal-realist” analysis following Menger’s emphasis on causal explanation and a focus 
on real-world, day-to-day prices, emerged in the early twentieth century, but was largely 
supplanted by the Marshallian-Walrasian synthesis that dominated the economics profession 
after World War II (Salerno, 1993, 2002). Beginning with Hayek’s work on tacit knowledge 
(Hayek, 1937, 1945) and the competitive process (Hayek, 1948, 1968), Austrians began 
challenging the neoclassical assumption that prices can be assumed to equal their “equilibrium” 
values Machovec (1995). One interpretation of Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship is that it 
provides an equilibration process that justifies the welfare conclusions of “standard” economics 
(namely, that markets are efficient means of allocating scarce resources).3 However, as Klein 
                                                            
2 Compare Knight (1921, p.311): “The receipt of profit in a particular case may be argued to be the result of superior 
judgment. But it is judgment of judgment, especially one's own judgment, and in an individual case there is no way 
of telling good judgment from good luck and a succession of cases sufficient to evaluate the judgment or determine 
its probable value transforms the profit into a wage. . . . If . . . capacities were known, the compensation for exercis-
ing them can be competitively imputed and is a wage; only, in so far as they are unknown or known only to the 
possessor himself, do they give rise to a profit.”  
3 Kirzner's approach, as Boettke and Prychitko (1994, p.3) describes it, “provided the disequilibrium foundations of 
equilibrium economics that were required to complete the neoclassical project of explicating the operating principles 
of the price system.” Adds Boettke (2005): “Why is all this important? Well as Franklin Fischer pointed out in his 
very important book The Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics (1983) that unless we have good 
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(2008a) argues, causal-realist analysis is not concerned with long-run Marshallian or Walrasian 
equilibrium prices, but with actual, empirical, market prices, those occurring in what Mises calls 
the “plain state of rest.” In this understanding of the market, the existence or non-existence of 
equilibrating tendencies—the issue that divided “Kirznerians” and “Lachmannians,” and 
dominated much of the Austrian discussion in the 1980s—is relatively unimportant. For Mises, 
the critical “market process” is not the convergence to equilibrium, but rather the selection 
mechanism in which unsuccessful entrepreneurs—those who systematically overbid for factors, 
relative to eventual consumer demands—are eliminated from the market Mises (1951). It is this 
process that ensures that real-world, day-to-day prices are as “efficient” as they can be—in other 
words, that consumer sovereignty obtains at all times on the market. In Mises’s system, neither 
consumer-goods nor factor prices “converge,” in real time, to efficient, long-run equilibrium 
values, because the adjustment processes set in motion by profit-seeking entrepreneurs are 
frustrated, moment-by-moment, by exogenous changes in consumer preferences, technological 
knowledge, resource availabilities, and so on.4 The efficiency of the market, for Mises, results 
simply from the fact that prices are determined by the voluntary interactions of buyers and sellers 
according to their preferences over marginal units of goods and services.5 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
reasons to believe in the systemic tendency toward equilibrium we have no justification at all in upholding the 
welfare properties of equilibrium economics. In other words, without the sort of explanation that Kirzner provides 
the entire enterprise of neoclassical equilibrium is little more than a leap of faith.” 
4 Nor do prices obtaining on real markets achieve a “coordination of plans,” as final-goods prices may exceed or fall 
short of entrepreneurs’ expectations (leading to profits and losses). 
5 In his article “Mises and His Understanding of the Capitalist System”, Kirzner (1999) simultaneously accepts and 
dismisses Mises’s welfare analysis of plain-state-of-rest prices. “Once we have understood the central position of the 
doctrine of consumer sovereignty in Mises’ overall system, we can surely sense and appreciate the deep respect 
Mises felt for the actual market prices of productive resources. Certainly these prices are likely to be ‘false’ prices, 
in that they necessarily imperfectly anticipate the true future valuations of consumers for the various possible 
potential products (at the times when these products might conceivably be made available to consumers). 
Nonetheless, these prices, and the transactions in which they emerge, are wholly governed . . . by the preferences of 
consumers” (p. 225). And yet, Kirzner writes, “Mises is clearly entirely aware that the market prices at any given 
date are almost certainly not the ‘correct’ prices” (i.e., they are not long-run equilibrium prices). For Mises, in 
Kirzner’s interpretation, “[i]t is the market process, driven by the competition of profit-seeking entrepreneurs, that 
modifies those false prices and tends to ensure that they are replaced by prices more closely and ‘truthfully’ 
reflecting the underlying preferences of the consumers. What stimulates that process is the realization by 
entrepreneurs that the existing market-generated pattern of resource allocation is not the ideal one” (p. 216). If plain-
state-of-rest prices are “wholly governed” by the preferences of consumers, then they are efficient, whether the 
market-process modifies them or not. 
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As we interpret Mises, then, his entrepreneur plays a different role in the market system than 
that played by Kirzner’s entrepreneur. Rather than an equilibrator, Mises’s entrepreneur is a 
resource allocator. Mises begins with the marginal productivity theory of distribution developed 
by his Austrian predecessors. In the marginal productivity theory, laborers earn wages, 
landowners earn rents, and capitalists earn interest.6 Any excess (deficit) of a firm’s realized 
receipts over these factor payments constitutes profit (loss). Profit and loss, therefore, are returns 
to entrepreneurship. In a hypothetical equilibrium without uncertainty (what Mises calls the 
evenly rotating economy), capitalists would still earn interest as a reward for lending, but there 
would be no profit or loss. Outside the evenly rotating economy, however, factors may be priced 
above or below these equilibrium values, and shrewd entrepreneurs can acquire factors for less 
than their discounted marginal revenue products, leading to profit. Less capable entrepreneurs 
will overpay for factors, or choose inefficient factor combinations, or produce the wrong 
products, among other errors, and earn losses. This understanding of the market is central to 
Mises’s argument about the impossibility of economic calculation under socialism (i.e., a world 
without factor markets).7 
For Kirzner, the main effect of entrepreneurship is to push real-world, disequilibrium prices 
toward their long-run, equilibrium values. He is not particularly interested in the determinants or 
welfare properties of day-to-day, plain-state-of-rest prices, but rather the presence or absence of 
equilibrating tendencies. But is entrepreneurship necessarily equilibrating markets within 
                                                            
6 Following Fetter (1905), Rothbard (1962, 1978) characterizes all factor payments as rents, and emphasizes that in 
long-run equilibrium, only the “originary” factors land and labor earn net rents, while the gross rents accruing to 
capital goods are imputed back to the originary factors used to produce them.  
7 Entrepreneurs, in Mises’s explanation, make their production plans based on the current prices of factors of 
production and the anticipated future prices of consumer goods. What Mises calls economic calculation is the 
comparison of these anticipated future receipts with present outlays, all expressed in common monetary units. Under 
socialism, the absence of factor markets and the consequent lack of factor prices render economic calculation—and 
hence rational economic planning—impossible. Mises’s point is that a socialist economy may assign individuals to 
be workers, managers, technicians, inventors, and the like, but it cannot, by definition, have entrepreneurs, because 
there are no money profits and losses. Entrepreneurship, and not labor, management or technological expertise, is 
the crucial element of the market economy. As Mises puts it, directors of socialist enterprises may be allowed to 
“play market”—to make capital investment decisions as if they were allocating scarce capital across activities in an 
economizing way. But entrepreneurs cannot be asked to “play speculation and investment” (Mises, 1949, p. 705). 
Without entrepreneurship, a complex, dynamic economy cannot allocate resources to their highest-valued use. 
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Kirzner’s own analytical system? Several arguments have been advanced against Kirzner in the 
Austrian literature (Lachmann, 1986; Buchanan and Vanberg, 2008; Vaughn, 1992). First, if 
opportunities can be described as existing, objectively, then if entrepreneurs fail to discover all 
opportunities, equilibration does not take place (a possibility allowed for by Kirzner himself).8 
Second, if by equilibrium Kirzner has in mind Hayek’s sense of multi-period plan coordination, 
then Kirzner has introduced an intertemporal dimension that may wreak havoc with the whole 
notion of entrepreneurship as equilibrating. In parts of Kirzner’s early work (e.g., Kirzner, 1978), 
the exercise of entrepreneurship does not seem to presuppose uncertainty. If entrepreneurship 
means overcoming sheer ignorance by the exercise of alertness, this is a logically correct inference. 
However, uncertainty is clearly a fundamental aspect of action Mises (1949), and it seems difficult 
to argue that a theory of entrepreneurship can meaningfully abstract from it. However, introducing 
uncertainty may destroy the basis for the claim that entrepreneurship is equilibrating in the sense of 
achieving Hayekian plan coordination. This, of course, formed the core of Lachmann’s 
“equilibration skepticism” Lachmann (1986): Because of pervasive uncertainty, there is very little 
rational basis for entrepreneurs to form expectations of future consumer demands and resource 
scarcities, and such expectations are therefore more likely to be divergent than convergent.  
 Selgin (1987) argues that these debates misunderstand the nature of the equilibration 
process. Correctly understood, “equilibration” does not refer to coordination of plans as in Hayek 
(1937), mainstream stability theory, convergence to rational expectations equilibrium, and the like; 
it refers to entrepreneurial profits and losses. These are strictly subjective categories and have no 
objective basis outside the minds of entrepreneurs. Equilibration, in this sense, makes no reference 
to the state of knowledge of market participants and whether their plans are consistent. Indeed, 
Selgin (1987) dismisses the very notion of coordination in world in which profit opportunities 
cannot be thought of as “objectively existing”, in which preferences have no existence apart from 
actions, etc. Mises, also, focused on action, not perception; in this sense, entrepreneurship is not 
                                                            
8 See Alvarez and Barney (2007) and Klein (2008a) on the objectivity or subjectivity or entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
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about discovery in a hypothetical market construct, but the investment of resources under real-
world conditions.  
THE ENTREPRENEUR AS CAPITAL OWNER  
Kirzner’s ideal type of the “pure entrepreneur” is used to elucidate the coordinating function of 
entrepreneurship. While Clark and Mises introduced similar devices to emphasize selected aspects 
of entrepreneurship (Salerno, 2008; Klein and Foss, 2010), Kirzner sees his construct as capturing 
its very essence. Kirzner does not deny that business people, resource owners, financiers, traders, 
and the like exercise judgment, or that they possess boldness, creativity, and imagination, only that 
they need not exercise these functions to be alert to previously unknown profit opportunities. “My 
entrepreneurs were engaged in arbitrage, acting entrepreneurially even when they might not be 
seen as Schumpeterian ‘creators.’ . . . In so emphasizing the difference between Schumpeter’s 
theory of entrepreneurship and my own, I was motivated by my primary scientific objective. This 
was to understand the nature of the market process—even in its simplest conceivable contexts” 
(Kirzner, 2009, p.147).  
In elucidating his conception of the entrepreneurial market process, Kirzner has consistently 
emphasized the highly abstract nature of his “metaphor” of the entrepreneur Kirzner (2009).9 In 
contrast, most contributors to the entrepreneurship literatures in management and economics 
have given more detail to the entrepreneurial function. The amount of detail differs, however, 
depending on the explanatory purpose. For example, the opportunity-discovery literature in 
management research is taken up with the antecedents of specific, individual entrepreneurs and 
as such takes a rather detailed view of the entrepreneur (e.g., Shane, 2003). The judgment 
approach described above is concerned with the more “functional” (Klein, 2008b) issue of 
understanding the market selection process in the context of the profit and loss mechanism, and 
                                                            
9 Kirzner’s use of the notion of “metaphor” to characterize his entrepreneur construct seems puzzling: At least in 
usual parlance, a “metaphor” is a figure of speech in which a term or concept is used as a reference to something that 
it does not literally denote so that a potentially illuminating similarity is revealed. Isn’t Kirzner talking about real-
world entrepreneurs? We return to this issue later. 
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of understanding profit as a reward to entrepreneurship. In elucidating these functions, the 
judgment approach provides a somewhat richer view of the entrepreneur than the ghost-like 
Kirznerian pure entrepreneurs. Specifically, the judgment approach treats entrepreneurship as 
decision-making under uncertainty, implying asset ownership (Foss and Klein, 2005). It seeks to 
explain not only discovery, but action, focusing on what Salerno (2008) calls the “integral 
entrepreneur,” combining abstract processes of imagination and creativity with action on real 
markets. It may therefore be claimed to occupy a middle ground between the opportunity-
discovery literature of recent management research and Kirzner’s work on the pure entrepreneur.  
Kirzner has consistently emphasized that his “contribution is simply an extension and 
deepening of insights articulated by my teacher, Ludwig von Mises” (Kirzner, 2009, p.146). 
Specifically, the key insight in Mises that Kirzner’s work purportedly has sought to “expound 
and develop” (Kirzner, 2009, p.148) is the following one: “What makes profit emerge is the fact 
that the entrepreneur who judges the future prices of the products more correctly than other 
people do buy some or all of the factors of production at prices which, seen from the point of 
view of the future state of the market, are too low” (Mises, 1952, p.190). Kirzner argues that his 
notion of alertness (to price discrepancies) captures the essence of the Misesian view of 
entrepreneurship as captured in this quotation, and that, therefore, the simple model of the pure 
entrepreneur undertaken nearly-instantaneous arbitrage can be applied even to those situations 
where the discrepancies between the “future prices of the products” and the imputed prices of the 
“factors of production” involve very long time.  
By contrast, the Knightian (and, we would argue, Misesian) entrepreneur who owns capital 
and bears uncertainty—acting in calendar time—may possess the characteristics of the 
Kirznerian entrepreneur (i.e., being alert to potential, imagined opportunities for gain) but in 
addition must also possess the special faculty of exercising judgment uncertainty and must be a 
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capital owner (Foss and Klein, 2005; Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein, 2007).10 In contrast, Kirzner 
insists that the pure entrepreneur is a non-owner.. “An important point,” Kirzner argues (1978, p. 
47), “is that ownership and entrepreneurship are to be viewed as completely separate functions. 
Once we have adopted the convention of concentrating all elements of entrepreneurship into the 
hands of pure entrepreneurs, we have automatically excluded the asset owner from an 
entrepreneurial role. Purely entrepreneurial decisions are by definition reserved to decision-makers 
who own nothing at all.” Thus, the entrepreneur is a pure decision maker, and nothing else. And 
yet, Kirzner’s strict separation between the “discovery” and “ownership” functions of the 
entrepreneur raises some conceptual difficulties. As Rothbard (1985) noted, unless buying and 
selling are instantaneous, even arbitrageurs bear uncertainty, in that selling prices may change 
after goods and services are acquired for arbitrage.11 
ANTECEDENTS OF OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY 
Alertness to opportunities, the discovery of specific opportunities, and action based on those 
discovered opportunities are typically portrayed as discrete phases of market behavior. These 
phases could conceivably be separated by long stretches of time, and could have widely different 
antecedents or determinants. The applied entrepreneurship literature typically distinguishes 
between opportunity recognition (discovery) and opportunity exploitation (investment, firm 
formation, etc.), and has devoted considerable attention to cognitive and learning processes that 
might lead to discovery (Short, Ketchen, Shook, and Ireland, 2010, p. 55-56).  
                                                            
10 Klein (2008b) emphasizes that under uncertainty, profit opportunities never exist, objectively, that they are neither 
“discovered” nor “created,” but rather imagined, in the mind of the actor.  
11 As Rothbard says: “Kirzner's entrepreneur is a curious formulation. He need not, apparently, risk anything. He is a 
free-floating wraith, disembodied from real objects. He does not, and need not, possess any assets. All he need have 
to earn profits is a faculty of alertness to profit opportunities. Since he need not risk any capital assets to meet the 
chancy fate of uncertainty, he cannot suffer any losses. But if the Kirznerian entrepreneur owns no assets, then how 
in the world does he earn profits? Profits, after all, are simply the other side of the coin of an increase in the value of 
one’s capital; losses are the reflection of a loss in capital assets. The speculator who expects a stock to rise uses 
money to purchase that stock; a rise or fall in the price of stock will raise or lower the value of the stock assets. If the 
price rises, the profits are one and the same thing as the increase in capital assets. The process is more complex but 
similar in the purchase or hiring of factors of production, the creating of a product and then its sale on the market. In 
what sense can an entrepreneur ever make profits if he owns no capital to make profits on?” (Rothbard, 1985, p. 
282-83). 
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Mises, by contrast, does not distinguish between “discovery” and “exploitation” phases of 
entrepreneurship. Rather, as noted above, he makes action the unit of analysis, with discovery and 
its antecedents implied by action. In our own approach, investment under uncertainty is both 
necessary and sufficient for entrepreneurship to take place. Investment, as human action, already 
implies purpose or objective, so that invoking opportunities and discovery is simply a relabeling.12 
While Kirzner distinguishes sharply between “discovery” and “investment” or exploitation stages 
of the entrepreneurial process, he explicitly denies that the study of antecedents to discovery is part 
of the economic analysis of entrepreneurship. He maintains that his work “does not even aim to 
explore the roots and the determinants of individual entrepreneurial alertness” (Kirzner, 2009, p. 
148).  
 Kirzner’s objective, of course, is not to characterize entrepreneurship per se, but to explain 
the tendency for markets to clear. In the Kirznerian system, opportunities are (exogenous) 
arbitrage opportunities and nothing more. Entrepreneurship itself serves a purely instrumental 
function; it is the means by which Kirzner explains market clearing. As Kirzner (2009, p. 145) 
explains, reviewing his main contributions and critiquing his own critics: “my own work has 
nothing to say about the secrets of successful entrepreneurship. My work has explored, not the 
nature of the talents needed for entrepreneurial success, not any guidelines to be followed by 
would-be successful entrepreneurs, but, instead, the nature of the market process set in motion 
by the entrepreneurial decisions (both successful and unsuccessful ones!).”  
                                                            
12 Salerno (1993, p.119) describes Mises’s position this way: “[F]or Mises, the moment of choice coincides with the 
emergence of a value scale that is the raison d’être and consummation of the actor’s previous ‘discovery’ activities and 
that provides the framework for purposive behavior. Choice and action can only be conceived as occurring within such 
a ‘given situation.’ Contrary to Kirzner’s later interpretation of Mises, discovery cannot serve as the core of the central 
axiom in a praxeological system, precisely because there is no possibility of inferring from it the ‘given situation’ 
prerequisite to the moment of choice. A being who is ever seeking to ‘discover changes that have occurred’ in his 
situation can never act on those discoveries because he is incapable of creating the framework for choosing. In the 
newer Kirznerian interpretation, therefore, the Misesian homo agens has been transformed into homo quaerens, a 
perpetual and aimless seeker of new knowledge who is forever unable to turn it to account in improving his welfare; a 
shade who has become unstuck in (praxeological) time. … [A]ccording to Mises, ‘discovery’ is logically implied in the 
very concept of choice and need not be posited as an independent facet of human purposiveness. . . .  Or, in other 
words, from the perspective of Misesian praxeology, entrepreneurial information gathering and forecasting are never 
autonomous and free-flowing activities directly expressing purposefulness, but are always rigidly governed by the 
exigencies of choosing under uncertainty.” 
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Of course, arbitrage opportunities cannot exist in a perfectly competitive general-equilibrium 
model, so Kirzner’s framework assumes the presence of competitive imperfections. Beyond 
specifying general disequilibrium conditions, however, Kirzner offers no theory of how 
opportunities come to be identified, who identifies them, and so on; identification itself is a black 
box. The claim is simply that outside the Arrow–Debreu world in which all knowledge is 
effectively parameterized, opportunities for disequilibrium profit exist and tend to be discovered 
and exploited. In short, what Kirzner calls “entrepreneurial discovery” is simply that which 
causes markets to equilibrate. The focus is solely on the market process as being driven by 
alertness. Opportunity discovery is an analytical primitive, meaning that Kirzner does not address 
its antecedents/determinants.  
In terms of levels of analysis, then, Kirzner’s focus is entirely on abstract, aggregate effects of 
individual acts of alertness (i.e., a micro → macro relationship)  It is conceivable that richer models 
of opportunity discovery, however—including those incorporating the cognitive and motivational 
antecedents that characterize the opportunity-discovery literature in management research—may 
yield additional insights in aggregate outcomes, relating for example to the speed of adjustment, 
possible path-dependencies and informational cascades in the adjustment process, the nature of 
coordinated states, etc. While such inquiries could be seen as natural extensions of some 
contributions to Austrian economics (particularly Hayek, 1937), they clearly go beyond the scope 
of Kirzner’s interest and, perhaps, beyond his conception of what constitutes “pure theory.”  
However, Kirzner is ambiguous on these issues. First, he allows for error-correcting feedback 
effects from market interaction (i.e., a macro → micro relationship), not only from entrepreneurs 
who discover the profit opportunity introduced by other entrepreneurs’ errors, but also from 
entrepreneurs recognizing their own earlier mistakes. It is not entirely clear whether such a learning 
capability is logically implied by the discovery notion. Moreover, Kirzner sometimes treats 
disequilibrium opportunities for profit as exogenous determinants of entrepreneurial activity. For 
example, he invokes an imagery of traffic lights (opportunities) that prompt behaviors (discovery) 
12 
 
(Kirzner, 1992, p.151). On the other hand, he also treats opportunities metaphorically, noting that 
opportunities are “metaphorically waiting to be discovered,” not literally waiting to be 
discovered Kirzner (1997). Kirzner’s continued emphasis on the metaphorical nature of his 
constructs is somewhat puzzling. Arguing that a construct is a metaphor drives a wedge between 
the reality that the construct is supposed to throw light over and the construct itself. The 
construct and the reality it mirrors remain very different things (although illuminating the 
difference using the metaphor may be enlightening). In particular, use of metaphorical reasoning 
is different from using models, constructs, or ideal types meant to capture essential qualities of 
real phenomena (which a metaphor need not do). Perhaps Kirzner really means the latter, in 
which case the metaphor terminology appears misleading. Kirzner also insists that “the way in 
which policymakers understand the market economy is likely to carry enormously significant 
implications for encouragement or discouragement of entrepreneurial creativity” (Kirzner, 2009, 
p.151), suggesting that the models or ideal-typical notions of entrepreneurship held by policy-
makers affect entrepreneurial activity.  
More generally, Kirzner clearly argues that government interference with the price mechanism, 
such as regulation, antitrust, and other government policies that affect business decision-making, 
inhibits the entrepreneurial discovery process (e.g., Kirzner, 1979b, 1985) through their impact on 
the “presence” of profit opportunities:  
[D]irect controls by government on prices, quantities, or qualities of output 
production or input employment may unintentionally block activities which have, 
as yet, not been specifically envisaged by anyone. Where these blocked activities 
turn out to be entrepreneurially profitable activities (perhaps as a result of 
unforeseen changes in data), the likelihood of their being discovered is then sharply 
diminished. Without necessarily intending it, the spontaneous discovery process of 
the free market has thus been, to some extent, stifled or distorted (Kirzner, 1992). 
13 
 
Thus, government intervention seems to be capable of influencing the sheer amount of 
entrepreneurial activity through its impact on “discoverable” opportunities (in this case blocking 
certain opportunities). It is of course also possible that government intervention may create new 
opportunities à la the opportunities for destructive rent-seeking discussed by Baumol (1994). 
Moreover, various indications of a direct effect from government intervention to discovery can 
also be found in Kirzner’s work. For example, he argues that while “[w]e know very little that is 
systematic about what ‘switches on’ alertness . . . it does seem intuitively obvious that alertness 
can be ‘switched off’ by the conviction that external intervention will confiscate (wholly or in 
part) whatever one might notice” (Kirzner, 2009, p.151), Taxation hampers discovery by 
converting “open-ended” situations into “closed-ended” ones Kirzner (1985, p.111), while 
regulatory constraints “are likely to bar the discovery of pure profit opportunities” (Kirzner, 
1985, p.142, emphasis in original). The suggestion is that government intervention, while not 
eliminating discovery entirely, reduces its quantity and quality. The argument strikes us as ad 
hoc, and inconsistent with the purely exogenous character of Kirznerian profit opportunities. 
Moreover, even if true, the welfare implications are ambiguous. When it comes to discovery, is 
“more” necessarily better?  
CONCLUSIONS 
Our goal here has been to point out some potential drawbacks of Kirzner’s entrepreneurial 
discovery-process approach to the market. Outside the Austrian literature—and sometimes within 
it—one often gets the sense that Kirzner’s framework is the Austrian approach to the study of 
prices and markets. In fact, however, there is tremendous variety within the contemporary Austrian 
school on such fundamental issues. Indeed, we think Kirzner’s approach not only does not 
represent the logical continuation or extension of the basic Mengerian causal-realist approach, but 
instead departs from it in important ways.  
We have focused here on Kirzner’s portrayal of “pure entrepreneurship” and its role in the 
competitive market system. We have suggested that Kirzner goes too far in stripping the 
14 
 
entrepreneurial ideal type of concrete content; the “entrepreneur” in his work is simply a 
coordination device, and that is all. This raises several problems. First, it presumes a certain model 
of the market in which “coordination,” in the sense of converging to some kind of long-run, 
perfect-knowledge equilibrium, is the central problem economic theory needs to explain. Second, it 
limits the application of economics to real-world entrepreneurial behaviors and actions. We are not 
arguing that economists should embrace the much more expansive work on entrepreneurs 
undertaken in management research, describing them in various psychological dimensions and so 
on. Rather, we suggest that an emphasis on entrepreneurial action under uncertainty, focusing on 
investment, real prices, and the resulting profits and losses, provides richer insights into the market.  
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